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Article 8

“With a View to
Speech”
Akira Mizuta Lippit
The Beast & the Sovereign, by
Jacques Derrida, 2 volumes,
translated by Geoffrey
Bennington, edited by Geoffrey
Bennington and Peggy Kamuf.
The Seminars of Jacques Derrida.
Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2009 and 2011. Volume 1,
349 pp. $22.50 paper, $38.00 cloth.
Volume 2, 293 pp. $30.00 e-book,
$35.00 cloth.

The first two volumes of an ambitious project to publish Jacques
Derrida’s complete “teaching lectures” or seminars, delivered between 1968 and 2003 in French and
in English, begin at the end with
Derrida’s last, unfinished seminar
“The Beast & the Sovereign,” which
he presented during 2001–3 in
France and the United States. Geoffrey Bennington and Peggy Kamuf,
who supervise the English edition
of “The Seminars of Jacques Derrida,” and are also involved in the
French project published by Galilée,
explain the process by which Derrida’s lectures, which he called
“seminars” and which were in most
cases written out in their entirety
beforehand, originally by hand,
then by typewriter, and eventually
electronically, were transcribed, and
with minimal editing, published
first in French and then in English translation. “In all cases,” write
Bennington and Kamuf, along with
their cosignatories of the “General
Introduction to the French Edition” (Marc Crépon, Marguerite
Derrida, Thomas Dutoit, Michel
Lise, Marie-Louise Mallet, and Ginette Michaud), “our primary goal
is to present the text of the seminar,
as written by Jacques Derrida with
a view to speech, to reading aloud,
and thus with some marks of anticipated orality and some familiar
turns of phrase” (2009, xi, original
emphases).
Already at work in this complex
project is an irreducible ambiguity
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regarding the phenomenality of the
object, its objectivity (and objecthood) as such, but also its authority,
specifically its authorship. These
signatories, all of who worked
closely with Derrida (including
Marguerite), and whom Derrida
trusted deeply, are also involved
in an expanded economy of authorship that is not unrelated to
Derrida’s work. As they write in
the general introduction, “It is not
certain that Jacques Derrida would
have published the seminars as
they stand; probably he would have
reorganized or rewritten them”
(2009, xi). These supplementary
texts, written and spoken by Derrida, bear the marks then of a quasi
authorship, a virtual authorship he
shares with his colleagues posthumously. This precarious authorship
bears significantly upon the continued understanding of Derrida’s
oeuvre as a singularly important
event in the history of twentiethcentury thought since it is precisely
one of the themes to which Derrida turns and returns consistently,
here and elsewhere: Who or what
writes? Is writing written or spoken by a subject or does it arrive,
return, take place ipso facto with or
without an author? In his or her absence? And what constitutes writing, what are its genres, its genders
even? Who or what is sovereign in
writing, an author, he or she?
Among the notable phrases
in the editors’ introduction is the
claim that these seminars, to be

distinguished from Derrida’s published work, which he authorized
as their author, which he authored
in a more conventional sense of the
term, are texts written by Derrida
but “with a view to speech.” That is,
their authorship is performed as it
were live, in full view, perhaps, a
spectacle of speech and thought.
What might such a view be, and
how to view or review the visuality implicit in speech, inherent in
the two volumes that signal the
arrival of a writing genre with a
view to and perhaps of speech?
What mode of speech is made visible in these publications? What
does this thought look like? As the
editors suggest, it is Derrida himself, the dynamic temporality of his
thought, what Jean-Claude Lebensztejn once referred to as Derrida’s
“extravagant patience,” and the
rhythms with which his thought
unfolds that become visible.1 Not
simply the thought made text,
made flesh, transposed from and to
a body fixed in space, but a movement in time, changing in time,
over time and through space from
one session to the next. What is immediately but also slowly visible in
these volumes is the remarkable
manner in which Derrida’s signature form of teaching takes place,
marks time, a genre of thought
made sensual and temporal.
Along with the careful pacing
that Derrida sustains in his seminars, a kind of musical structure
with its own measures, refrains,

on the beast & the sovereign
keys, motifs, variations, deviations,
and contretemps, the seminars also
reveal Derrida’s incredible mobilization of thought: Derrida moves
vast philosophical, literary, political archives forward in the course
of his seminar, even as he himself
moves through them. Those who
attended his seminars will recall
this spectacular choreography: key
terms and phrases introduced early
on, but with very little sense of
their eventual destination return
throughout Derrida’s seminar,
slowly accruing new values, layers
of meaning, new sounds and tonalities, as he puts them into play
throughout a massive archive of
proper names and texts, drawing
from these terms and phrases new
etymologies, neologisms, and ultimately new epistemologies. The
process is breathtaking and at times
overwhelming: what is hardly visible at the beginning feels inevitable by the seminar’s end, as though
Derrida anticipated all along and
from a great distance the exact endpoint of his seminar. As if those end
points were always there from the
beginning. How could one have
missed them at first? What these
first two volumes make amply clear
is that Derrida did envision and
anticipate the exact end point of
each seminar, even if this particular
seminar remains unfinished. Not
an end that closes thought, a fixed
terminal at the end of thought, but
the ends of thought already there,
present in each instance and instant
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of thought. The published seminar
shows the extent to which Derrida
was capable of keeping in play a
multitude of thoughts and citations
while moving carefully along various trajectories at once toward not
a single terminal point, but a constellation of thought, a universe or
cosmos, at the end of each seminar.
As Derrida indicates at the beginning of The Beast & the Sovereign,
the seminar follows from the one
that precedes it on the death penalty, and his concern with the role
that sovereignty plays in the regulation of life, what has been taken up
more recently (via Giorgio Agamben invoking Michel Foucault) as
biopolitics. The seminar also has
another point of origin in Derrida’s
presentation at the 1997 colloquium
at Cerisy-La-Salle, “L’animal autobiographique,” where he presented
his first iteration of what would
become his seminar “L’animal que
donc je suis.” At the time, Derrida referred to this project as his
largest ever. So large it remains
incomplete, due to his untimely
death perhaps, but the publication
of the seminars themselves reveals
that in some ways the seminar’s incompleteness may be intrinsic to its
closure: The Beast & the Sovereign
operates as a culmination of Derrida’s work and thought, a horizon
that allows Derrida to look forward
and backward at once, as he once
noted in his reading of Nietzsche’s
Ecce Homo (1888). And one might
draw a line, sometimes visible at
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others cryptic, between Nietzsche’s
autobiography that points to man
that beholds man, and Derrida’s
equally autobiographical seminar
(although in a different idiom) that
names two outlaws, two ends of
man and of being that rest outside
the law, above and beneath, and always before the law: the beast and
the sovereign.
And if the seminar makes visible
a genre unique to Derrida’s thought,
the seminar itself, then it also takes
up the very question of genre, of
gender already at work in the key
terms beast and sovereign, and the
very question of man, or mankind,
at the origin of those concepts. For
Derrida, the question of gender is
also inseparable from the genre in
which he addresses the question of
gender. Derrida’s seminar begins
with this attention to gender, to
the language of gender but also to
the genders of language that name
his terms: “Feminine . . . masculine [La . . . le].” “Let me recall,” he
begins, “the title proposed for this
year’s seminar: the beast [feminine:
la bête] and the sovereign [masculine: le souverain]. La, le” (2009, 1).
As Derrida makes clear from the
first words of his seminar, the intersections of life and law open several
lines of inquiry that intersect across
the fields they traverse: a line between human beings and animals,
as the seminar’s title suggests, but,
within and alongside this line and
across it, another set of lines including those thresholds that constitute

gender traverse the beast and the
sovereign, feminine and masculine,
she and he. From the beginning,
readers are able to see the rich layering of Derrida’s thought, not in
the form of a completed book or
published essay but as a living process, a movement.
Among the many displays in
these volumes is Derrida’s impeccable attention to detail, his historical
rigor, his careful readings of even
brief passages, his creativity and
unrivaled ingenuity, but also his
wit, playfulness, and polemics—
revelations perhaps for those who
never attended these live seminars. One of the most spectacular
visualizations of Derrida’s process
appears in his explication of the
term bêtise, colloquial French for
“stupid,” but also the word that
names stupidity as bestial. Derrida
devotes considerable time to translating and situating the nuances of
this term in its French vernacular,
pointing out the inconsistency of its
usage, nuance, and affect—an inconsistency that gives Derrida the
exact point of entry into his reflections on the languages of animality
from which animals are themselves
supposedly excluded. Challenging
Gilles Deleuze’s use of bêtise only
ever to characterize human beings
and never animals, Derrida asks
what it might mean to imagine
an animal capable of stupidity, an
animal capable of animality. The
line of inquiry is deeply suggestive
and flows into a similar critique

on the beast & the sovereign
Derrida forges against Jacques
Lacan’s use of “bestiality,” or cruelty, to refer to human actions in the
name of the animal. Can one imagine an animal capable of cruelty
and stupidity, Derrida asks, and
doesn’t the anthropocentrism of
Deleuze and Lacan, among many
if not most other philosophers and
thinkers, rest precisely in designating exclusively human traits in the
name and with the name of the
animal? In Derrida’s reading of
the philosophical discourse on animals and animality, from classical
Greek thought to German idealism
and contemporary critical theory,
the animal is only ever the name
for a distinctively human quality
that bears the name animal: a true
thinking of animals, of animality,
and more precisely of a language
of animality that recognizes the
plurality of what was once called
“the animal,” and which Derrida renames “l’animot,” is yet to
come—or, in Derrida’s idiom, yet
to respond. This seminar begins the
process of imagining such a possibility and responsibility.
The improvisational dimension of Derrida’s teaching appears
in his unexpected turn to Daniel
Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719), a
gesture set in motion by a student
paper on the novel submitted to
Derrida’s graduate seminar at the
University of California, Irvine.
Derrida’s reading of Robinson Crusoe facilitates an extended reflection on islands and solitude, and a
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deeply moving elaboration of the
difference between the discourses
of world (in Heidegger most notably) and the concept of an island,
between plenitude (multitude) and
solitude. “So our seminar will have
as its horizon,” says Derrida
not only the questions of
solitude, loneliness, insularity, isolation and therefore
exception, including the sovereign exception. It will have
as its horizon the question of
what “inhabit,” “cohabit,”
“inhabit the world” mean—
and therefore what the world
means. The world as a great
traditional theme of metaphysics, and of theology, the
world as presupposition of
what is today called globalization [mondialisation], but
also the world of phenomenological and ontological
meditations. (2011, 11)
For Derrida, the habitat—the Umwelt that locates human beings and
animals in their proper places, and
that distinguishes being-with from
solitude, and sovereignty from
animality—returns to this foundational philosophical and geological dialectic between worlds and
islands, rediscovered in Defoe’s
novel. “Perhaps there is too much
world in the world,” says Derrida,
“but who can assure us that there is a
world? Perhaps there is no world?”
(2011, 266). Derrida’s stirring, at
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times melancholic reflections on
the possibility of a world without
worlds, a worldless world consisting only of islands, remains in the
pages of these sessions a singular
pedagogical event.
It is hard not to feel, in these
first publications of Derrida’s,
seminars in reverse, in this time
machine that begins at the end
and moves backward, a deep sense
of regret that Derrida was unable
to think this thought to its end, to
complete the force of his thinking
of and through the beast and the
sovereign, she and he, they and
him. But one also sees conversely,
in hindsight, in Derrida’s method
and his physics, a sense of absolute
completion, even of rest. Even
without a proper ending, the seminar feels thought to its conclusion,
in part because one realizes in these
transcriptions that Derrida’s thinking contains its terminus from the
start, that the texture of his thought
as he thinks and extends it moves
not linearly from start to finish,
but rather in volumes of thought,
opening depths whose possibilities
are visible before one reaches their
ends. Those ends are there from
the start, and this view of Derrida’s
practice is invaluable.

If the first two volumes of the
English-language edition of The
Seminars of Jacques Derrida are exemplary of the volumes to follow,
then the editors have ensured a
long, sustained engagement with
Jacques Derrida’s thought for
many present and future readers.
Beautifully translated, gently edited, and carefully assembled, these
volumes capture Derrida’s vitality
of thought as it emerged word by
word, step by step, and turn by turn
over time in his seminars. It is still
there, this vitality moving slowly
backward in time, irrevocably live
and alive, visibly there where he
once was.
Akira Mizuta Lippit is professor of film
and literature at the University of Southern
California. He is the author of Ex-Cinema:
From a Theory of Experimental Film
and Video (University of California Press,
2012), Atomic Light (Shadow Optics)
(University of Minnesota Press, 2005), and
Electric Animal: Toward a Rhetoric of
Wildlife (University of Minnesota Press,
2000), and is presently completing a book
on contemporary Japanese cinema and the
image of the world.

Note
1. Jean-Claude Lebensztejn, “Star,” trans.
John Johnston, October 1 (1976): 88.

